Abstract. We prove a dichotomy theorem for the rank of propositional contradictions, uniformly generated from first-order sentences, in both the Lovász-Schrijver (LS) and Sherali-Adams (SA) refutation systems. More precisely, we first show that the propositional translations of firstorder formulae that are universally false, that is, fail in all finite and infinite models, have LS proofs whose rank is constant, independent of the size of the (finite) universe. In contrast to that, we prove that the propositional formulae that fail in all finite models, but hold in some infinite structure, require proofs whose SA rank grows polynomially with the size of the universe. Until now, this kind of so-called complexity gap theorem has been known for tree-like Resolution and, in somehow restricted forms, for the Resolution and Nullstellensatz systems. As far as we are aware, this is the first time the Sherali-Adams lift-and-project method has been considered as a propositional refutation system (since the conference version of this paper, SA has been considered as a refutation system in several further papers). An interesting feature of the SA system is that it simulates LS, the Lovász-Schrijver refutation system without semi-definite cuts, in a rank-preserving fashion.
Introduction
It is a trivial observation that the question as to whether a given propositional formula has a satisfying assignment can be reduced to a feasibility question for a certain integer linear program (ILP). Yet the easy reduction of a set of clauses to a set of inequalities, when applied to propositional contradictions, gives rise to some very interesting propositional refutation systems based on different methods for solving ILP.
By tradition, the two most important ILP-based refutation systems are Cutting Planes, introduced as a general method for solving ILP in Gomory (1958) , and as a refutation system in Cook et al. (1987) , and Lovász-Schrijver (LS), introduced as a general method for solving ILP in Lovász & Schrijver (1991) , and first considered as a refutation system in Pudlák (1999) . A number of mixtures of ILP-based refutation systems and algebraic refutation systems are introduced and studied in Grigoriev et al. (2002) .
Another method for solving ILP was proposed in Sherali & Adams (1990) but was not explored as a propositional refutation system until the conference version of this paper, Dantchev (2007) . Since then, SA has been considered explicitly as a refutation system in . Furthermore, various results about integrality gaps have yielded lower bounds for SA as a refutation system, for example, those given in Schoenebeck (2008) . The SA relaxation is interesting in that it is a static and stronger version of LS, the Lovász-Schrijver relaxation without semi-definite cuts. More precisely, it is proved in Laurent (2003) that the rank k SA relaxation is tighter than the rank k LS relaxation. The fact that SA is stronger than LS as a refutation system follows from Rhodes (2008) .
A number of lower bounds have been proven for ILP-based refutation systems. A non-comprehensive list of previous results relevant to our work include the LS and LS + rank lower bounds for a number of specific contradictions from Buresh-Oppenheim et al. (2006) as well as the LS rank lower bound for the pigeonhole principle from Grigoriev et al. (2002) . No size lower bounds are known for LS [other than for its tree-like restriction-see Beame et al. (2007) and Pitassi & Segerlind (2009)], and it seems that the cc 22 (2013) Rank complexity gap for LS and SA 193 rank is the better complexity measure for LS in the same way that the degree is a good complexity measure for the algebraic refutation systems. More recently, and since the conference version of this paper, attention has focussed on integrality gaps for SA and its semi-definite variant, the Lasserre relaxation [see, for example, Charikar et al. (2009); Georgiou et al. (2009); Mathieu & Sinclair (2009); Schoenebeck (2008) ]. The Lasserre relaxations are tighter than each of LS, LS + and SA. Among a number of interesting results in Schoenebeck (2008) , it is proved that the Ω(n)th rank of Lasserre cannot prove a random k-SAT formula unsatisfiable.
All results in Buresh-Oppenheim et al. (2006) and Grigoriev et al. (2002) are lower bounds for specific contradictions. The aim of this paper is to prove a very general LS rank lower bound that would apply to a large class of contradictions, namely those that can be expressed as FO sentences. Note that the pigeonhole principle as well as the least number principle (stating that a finite order has no minimal element) are such contradictions, which have been much studied in the context of propositional proof complexity. Thus, our motivation was to obtain a result, similar in spirit to the so-called complexity gap theorem for tree-like Resolution, explicitly stated and proved in Riis (2001) Since Riis (2001) , various complexity gap, or classification, theorems have appeared: for a restricted class of contradictions for Resolution in Dantchev & Riis (2003) , for Nullstellensatz in Riis (2008) , for Cutting Planes in and for a parameterized variant of tree-like Resolution in Dantchev et al. (2011) . In its strongest form, our result can be stated as follows. In the light of the rank-preserving simulation of LS by SA, this provides matching gap theorems for LS and SA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the two refutation systems LS and SA, and explain the translation of an FO sentence into a family of finite propositional contradictions. The main part of the paper, Section 3, contains the proof of Theorem 1.2. It is divided into two-we first prove the "easy", constant LS rank, case in Section 3.1 and then move onto the "hard" non-constant lower bound for the SA rank in Section 3.2. We finally discuss some open questions.
Preliminaries
The Lovász-Schrijver (LS) refutation system. Lovász-Schrijver is a lift-and-project refutation system: it operates on linear inequalities over continuous variables in [0, 1] by first "lifting" them into quadratic inequalities via multiplication by certain linear terms and then "projecting" these back into linear inequalities by taking linear combinations in which the quadratic terms cancel out. Formally, we introduce two continuous [0, 1] 3. Add any two inequalities.
An LS derivation of an inequality from a set of inequalities (often called axioms) can be represented as a tree, whose leaves are labelled by axioms, and such that every internal node is labelled by an inequality that can be derived in a single step, using Rules 1, 2 or 3, from the inequalities that label the children of the node. The root of the tree is labelled by the inequality that is finally derived.
The rank of an LS derivation is the maximal number of derivation steps, using Rule 1, that is, multiplications of a linear inequality by a variable, over all branches (paths from the root to a leaf) of the derivation tree. The rank of an inequality with respect to a set of axioms is the minimal rank over all possible derivations of the inequality from the axioms. Finally, the LS rank of an unsatisfiable CNF ϕ is the rank of the inequality −1 ≥ 0 with respect to the axioms.
The Sherali-Adams (SA) refutation system. Sherali-Adams is a static refutation system, so we shall define SA refutations of rank k, for every k, 0 ≤ k < n. More specifically, we shall encode a CNF formula ϕ over n propositional variables as a linear program We first introduce variables p C for every conjunct C = i∈I l i of no more than k + 1 variable-distinct literals l i , |I| ≤ k + 1 (we shall write |C| ≤ k + 1 instead). Ideally, we would like to have p C = 1 if C = and p C = 0 otherwise. However, what we can express in linear programming is the inequalities
as well as the equations
for every conjunct C with |C| ≤ k and every variable v. We also add the obvious equation
where ∅ is the empty conjunct (of size 0, that is, ∅ = ). Note that these equations do not depend on the initial CNF ϕ but only on the rank k. As for the clauses (disjuncts) of ϕ, we encode any such clause D ≡ j∈J l j by the following set of linear inequalities
for every conjunct C with |C| ≤ k. It is important to note that when writing indices of the form l ∧ C, the variable p l∧C vanishes whenever ¬l is present in C [alternatively, one may keep such variables and see that they must evaluate to zero due to (2.2)]. Finally, we say that the CNF ϕ has an SA refutation of rank k if k is the smallest number for which the linear system L k , consisting of equations (2.2, 2.3) and inequalities (2.1, 2.4), is inconsistent. Thus, the system L k itself serves as a refutation of ϕ that can be verified in polynomial (in its size) time by some polynomial time linear programming algorithm. On the other hand, in order to establish a rank lower bound k for an SA refutation, we need to produce a valuation of the variables p C with |C| ≤ k + 1 that satisfies the linear system L k . It is not hard to see that SA simulates LS in a rank-preserving fashion. The following proposition may be inferred from Laurent (2003) , but we give its (easy) proof for completeness.
Proposition 2.5. An inequality that can be derived in LS rank k is consequent of the inequalities of SA rank k.
Proof. By induction on the rank k. The case k = 0 (the axioms) is trivial. Suppose that it is true for rank k. An inequality that can be derived in LS rank k + 1 is a positive linear combination of inequalities of the form j∈J α j p l j p l ≥ βp l , for real numbers
Translation of FO sentences into propositional CNF formulae. We use the language of FO logic with equality but without function or constant symbols, that is, we only allow relation symbols. The omission of constants is purely for technical simplicity (note that constants may be simulated by outermost added existential quantifiers). We assume that the FO sentence is in prenex normal form. The purely universal case is easy-a formula of the form
where F is quantifier-free, is translated into propositional CNF as follows. Let us first consider F (x 1 , x 2 , . . . x k ) as a propositional formula over propositional variables of two different kinds:
where R is a p-ary predicate symbol, and (x i = x j ). We transform F into CNF and then take the union of all such CNF formulae for x 1 , x 2 , . . . x k ranging over [n] k (assuming the finite universe is [n] = {1, 2, . . . n}). The variables of the form (x i = x j ) evaluate to either true or false, and we are left with R-variables only.
The general case-a formula of the form 
The original formula can be transformed into the following purely universal one
We shall call clause (2.6) a "big" (or Skolem) clause, and a clause that results as in the translation of (2.7), a "small" clause, in order to emphasize the fact that the former contain n literals, while the latter contains a constant number of literals independent of n. For a given FO sentence ψ, we denote its CNF propositional translation obtained as explained above by C ψ,n where n is the size of the (finite) model. We also consider the (infinite) case n = ω, which is an infinite (but countable) propositional CNF that has the same set of countable models as the FO sentence ψ, except for the Skolem relations S i (x 1 , x 2 , . . . x i , y i ) that are made explicit in C ψ,ω . It is easy to see that C ψ,n is satisfiable iff ψ has a model of size n.
Given a (propositional) variable of the form 1 , c 2 , . . . c p , x) , we call c 1 , c 2 , . . . c p arguments of R i or S j , respectively. We call x the witness of S j . We also call c 1 , c 2 , . . . c p and x the elements of R i or S j , respectively. Two propositional formulae, built upon R-variables and S-variables, are isomorphic iff there is a bijection between the elements of the two that induces a bijection between the variables that in turn induces an isomorphisms between the formulae. Given a propositional formula ϕ, built upon R-variables and S-variables, we call instances of ϕ all formulae that are isomorphic to ϕ. The FO sentences that have no models, either finite or infinite, are universally false, so they have (finite) refutations in any sound and complete refutation system for FO logic. We shall first introduce such a refutation system, which is in fact FO Resolution but presented in a tableau-style manner. We shall then show how to translate a refutation of an FO contradiction ψ into a constant rank LS refutation of C ψ,n ("constant" here and hereafter means being independent of the size of the finite model n).
The refutation of ψ is a decision tree T ψ that tries to build a model of C ψ,ω as follows. It starts with witnessing some unary Skolem relation in ψ with the constant 1 and deriving further constants as Skolem witnesses of already derived constants as and when necessary. (Note that we tend to discount the empty model. It is, therefore, possible to have ψ with no finite models and no outermost existential quantifier. In this case, we may instantiate a single constant at the outset to get us going.) Every internal node of T ψ makes one of the following two kinds of queries: (c 1 , c 2 , . . . c p ) where R i is a p-ary predicate symbol from ψ, and c 1 , c 2 , . . . c p are constants that have already been witnessed along the path from the root of T ψ to the current node. The tree then branches on the two possible answers, ⊥ and .
A Boolean query of the form R i

A Skolem query of the form
where S j is a q-ary Skolem relation witnessing a variable x for some already existing constants c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c q . There are finitely many possible answers to such a query-x is either one of the r constants witnessed along the path from the root to the current node, {1, 2, . . . r}, or a new constant, which takes the next available "name", r + 1.
Every node u of the tree T ψ can naturally be labelled by the conjunction C u of all answers to the queries made along the path from the root to u. A branch is closed, or equivalently its end node v cc 22 (2013) is a leaf of the tree, iff the conjunction C v contradicts one of the small clauses of C ψ,ω . The order of variables in which the decision tree T ψ makes queries is as follows. Given the set of constants U = {1, 2, . . . r}, known at a certain node u of the tree, any R-variable (with arguments within U ) comes before any S-variable (with arguments within U ). The order of S j (c 1 , c 2 , . . . c q , x) -variables is lexicographically ascending on the tuples-in fact any order that eventually lists every possible S-variable is adequate for our purpose.
In other words, when starting from u with the set of known constants U = {1, 2, . . . r}, the decision tree T ψ first expands a subtree rooted at u that makes all Boolean R-queries with arguments in U . Any leaf of the subtree then picks the first S-variable that has not yet been queried, and branches on it. If the answer was within U , the next S-variable is picked up and queried and so on; if the answer was a new constant (whose name is now r + 1), the respective node expands a subtree that queries all R-variables with at least one argument set to r + 1. Any leaf of the subtree then picks the next unqueried S-variable and so on. Of course, one has to bear in mind that a branch is closed, that is, the respective node becomes a leaf of the decision tree, as soon as the information gathered by the queries along the branch is a direct contradiction to one of the small clauses of C ψ,ω .
It is not hard to see that the procedure described above is a sound and complete refutation system for FO logic.
Theorem 3.1. The decision tree T ψ is finite if and only if C ψ,ω is a propositional contradiction, which is equivalent to ψ being an FO contradiction.
Proof. Indeed, by expanding the decision tree T ψ , one attempts to create all at most countable models of C ψ,ω , both finite and infinite. If the tree is finite, that is, all branches have been closed, it follows that ψ has no models, that is, it is an FO contradiction.
It is not hard to see that an infinite branch is in fact an infinite model as it never violates a small clause and eventually satisfies any big clause by finding a witness for the infinite disjunction. Suppose now that ψ is an FO contradiction (C ψ,ω is a propositional cc 22 (2013) Rank complexity gap for LS and SA 201 contradiction) but the tree T ψ is infinite. As the branching factor of every internal node is finite, by König's lemma, there must be an infinite branch which constitutes an infinite model of ψ-a contradiction.
Example 3.2. We give an example of a decision tree T ψ constructed as in the procedure just given. We consider the following sentence ψ which has no models:
∀x∃y R(x, y) ∧ ∃x∀y ¬R(x, y).
As per our translation to propositional clauses, this is equivalent to the conjunction of the universal clauses
together with the Skolem clauses ∀x∃y S 2 (x, y) and ∃x S 1 (x).
Figure 3.1 shows an FO decision tree for this system of clauses. The number following each # specifies the clause that has been contradicted. For example, the bottom right # comes from the knowledge S 2 (1, 2) and ¬R(1, 2)-which contradicts the first universal clause. ♦ Before we explain how to turn a finite decision tree T ψ into a constant rank LS refutation of C ψ,n , we need the following technical lemma.
where α j > 0 for every j, and β > 0. The lemma follows trivially from the fact that the LS rank of a valid inequality is bounded from above by the number of variables. We will, however, give a concrete derivation for the sake of completeness.
Proof. We shall prove by induction on i that the inequality
has a rank i derivation. The basis case i = 0 is trivial. As for the inductive step, we multiply the inequality (3.4) by p ¬l i+1 , and get
For every j = i + 1, we add the equation p l i+1 + p ¬l i+1 − 1 = 0 multiplied by −p l j to the inequality p l i+1 ≥ 0 multiplied by p l j and we then multiply the result by either −β if j ≤ i or α j if j ≥ i + 2 and add it to (3.5) in order to transform any term of the form p l j p ¬l i+1 into the term p l j . We finally multiply the equation
Rank complexity gap for LS and SA 203 p l i+1 + p ¬l i+1 − 1 = 0 by β and add it to the transformed inequality (3.5). The final result then is
which completes the inductive step. In the end, we multiply the final inequality (3.5) for i = d by 1 β in order to get the desired
Each inductive step increased the rank by at most 1, so the total rank of the derivation is at most d as claimed.
We are now ready to state and prove our main lemma in the "easy" case. Proof. We shall proceed by induction on h u .
The basis case h u = 0 is easy: u is a leaf of the tree, so it is labelled by a direct contradiction to a small clause. More formally, the information gathered along the path from the root to u is a conjunction of the form i∈C ¬l i ∧ j∈D l j where the disjunction i∈C l i is a small clause from C ψ,n . Recall now that the LS encoding of that clause is i∈C p l i − 1 ≥ 0, which when added to the LS axioms p ¬l j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ D gives the desired result i∈C p l i + j∈D p ¬l j − 1 ≥ 0, and note that this derivation is of rank 0.
As for the inductive step in case h u > 0, we need to consider the type of query which the internal node u makes. Let us first denote the conjunction label of u by i∈C l i , where each l i is a literal built upon either an R-variable or an S-variable. , x) ). Denoting the set of constants, known at the node u, by U = {1, 2, . . . r}, there are r + 1 successors of u in the tree. We shall consider two sub-cases:
(a) x is a constant already known, that is, x ∈ U . By the inductive hypothesis, the inequalities i∈C
have LS derivations of rank at most h (h u − 1).
(b) x is a new constant, that is, x = r + 1. As the set of known constants U is contiguous at any node of the decision tree, that is, x / ∈ U is equivalent to x / ∈ Elms i∈C l i , that is, by the inductive hypothesis, we can derive all instances of i∈C l i ∧S j (c, x) where cc 22 (2013) Rank complexity gap for LS and SA 205
x / ∈ Elms i∈C l i . (Here Elms (C) denotes the set of all elements mentioned by the conjunct C.) Thus, we can derive in LS the inequalities
by derivations of rank at most h (h u − 1).
Adding together the inequalities obtained in the two cases yields
We now add the inequality above to the big clause
Finally, an application of Lemma 3.3 with α i = n, β = 1, and d = |C| ≤ h gives the desired inequality with an LS derivation of rank at most h.
In the end, we can derive and state the main theorem as an easy consequence of Lemma 3.7. Indeed, applying the lemma to the root of the decision tree T ψ , we realize that there is an LS derivation of the inequality −1 ≥ 0 of rank at most h 2 , thus proving the following:
Theorem 3.8. Given an FO contradiction ψ, its standard translation into propositional CNF over a finite universe of size n C ψ,n has an LS refutation of constant rank that depends on the formula ψ but does not depend on n.
206 Dantchev & Martin cc 22 (2013) 3.2. Infinite model implies non-constant Sherali-Adams rank. We shall prove that if an FO sentence ψ has an infinite model, the rank of the SA refutation of its propositional translation C ψ,n grows with n. As an SA refutation is simply an inconsistent linear program, we shall show that for every fixed k, there is a big enough n 0 = n (k) such that for every n ≥ n 0 , the rank k SA linear program for C ψ,n is consistent. This can be done by establishing a specific valuation of the variables of the SA system via a counting (or probabilistic) argument over all finite segments of any class of infinite models of ψ (or more precisely, C ψ,ω ). If we consider the class of all countable models of C ψ,ω , the lower bound on the SA rank k as a function of the size of the model n is polynomial, that is, Ω (n ε ) for some constant ε, 0 < α ≤ 1 , that depends only on the FO sentence ψ.
We start by recalling the structure of the rank k SA system (linear program) for an FO sentence ψ, which we denote by L ψ,k,n . It is built upon real variables of the form p j∈C l j where the index j∈C l j is a conjunction of no more than k + 1 literals l j , each of which is made up of either an R-variable or an S-variable. L ψ,k,n consists of the following equations and inequalities: for every |C| ≤ k and every small-clause i∈D l i in C ψ,n , and (3.13)
x∈ [n] p j∈C l j ∧S i (c,x) ≥ p j∈C l j for every |C| ≤ k, every Skolem relation S i in C ψ,n , and every tuplec.
Note that the equations (3.9) and (3.10) as well as the inequalities (3.11) do not depend on ψ. One should also bear in mind that in the LHSs of the inequalities (3.12) and (3.13), every term, whose index contains both a literal and its negation, simply vanishes.
We are now ready to state and prove the general SA rank lower bound lemma.
Lemma 3.14. For a given FO sentence ψ that has an infinite model, there are constants α, β such that for every fixed k > β and every n ≥ k α , the linear program L ψ,k,n is consistent.
Proof. We consider a set M of labelled countable models of C ψ,ω . What this means is that we label the elements of a countable universe by the positive integers. Note that if M ∈ M and M is obtained from M by taking a permutation of the positive integers (the labels), the models M and M are distinct as labelled models, even though they are isomorphic in the usual model-theoretic sense (as unlabelled models 
